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COVID-19 will hit financial institutions with a substantial time lag, but the 
coming storm will be fierce. The EU banking sector is entering the troubled 
waters of the Corona crisis with four major vulnerabilities: (1) Market and 
(2) funding liquidity risks have been mitigated by bold policy measures at 
EU and national level. (3) Concentration risk in banks’ sovereign exposures 
could be addressed by a European recovery fund. The immense economic 
fallout will further depress banks’ already weak (4) levels of profitability. 
Losses will erode banks’ capital base, putting their viability at severe risk. 
Monetary, fiscal and prudential emergency measures are keeping the real 
economy afloat but fail to enhance banks’ resilience. To withstand the cri-
sis, EU policymakers should require banks to suspend all discretionary dis-
tributions and preserve capital instead. 
#Banking
#PrudentialRegulation 
#Covid19
After attacking our health systems, social life and the real economy, COVID-19 
will also spread to the banking system. Monetary, fiscal and prudential policy 
measures are shielding the financial sector from the economic fallout, but, 
depending on the depth and length of the recession, credit losses will reach 
banks to a greater or lesser extent. Whereas the Great Financial Crisis (GFC) 
of 2007/2008 emerged in the banking sector and went on to become first 
an economic and then a eurozone crisis, Corona has first brought the real 
economy to a halt which in turn will affect the banking sector in its ability 
to provide credit to companies and households. Before the pandemic hits 
financial institutions, now is the right time to take a snapshot view of the 
state they are in and reflect on what could be an appropriate policy response 
to banks’ endangered viability. 
This Policy Brief suggests that monetary, fiscal and prudential emergency 
measures are indeed keeping the real economy afloat but fail to enhance 
banks’ resilience. Credit losses will erode banks’ capital base and thus 
endanger their viability. To withstand the crisis, EU policymakers should 
require banks to suspend all discretionary distributions and preserve capital 
instead. Section 1 analyses the major vulnerabilities of European banks, 
assesses the effects of the policy measures adopted so far and concludes that 
they failed to address banks’ deteriorating profitability. Section 2 critically 
assesses the recent legislative banking package proposal from the European 
Commission (“CRR quick-fix”) and argues against overshooting prudential 
relief for banks that would endanger financial stability. Section 3 makes the 
case for banks’ internal capital conservation to preserve their resilience.
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1 Analysis of EU banks’ major vulnerabilities and evaluation of recent policy measures
At the beginning of 2020, banks were more resilient than at the onset of the GFC. In the 
previous decade, financial institutions built up substantial capital and liquidity buffers to better 
absorb potential losses and temporary funding constraints. In parallel, the banks’ regulatory 
environment has been strengthened to enhance financial stability: Following the global Basel 
III reforms published by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in December 2010, 
the EU put in place a harmonised EU banking framework (Capital Requirements Regulation and 
Capital Requirements Directive, CRR and CRD) and a European bank regulator (European Banking 
Authority, EBA) fostering convergence of supervisory practices. Furthermore, the EU institutions 
agreed to create a Banking Union built on three pillars: the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 
and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) became operational in 2014 and 2015, respectively, 
whereas the details of the European Deposit Insurance Scheme (EDIS) are still being discussed 
among EU co-legislators. 
Since the outbreak of the Corona pandemic, European governments, the European Commission, 
European Central Bank (ECB) and banks’ prudential supervisors have acted decisively. The 
emergency measures are maintaining the all-important flow of credit to the economy which in 
turn is mitigating the negative effects of the crisis on the financial system. However, given the 
magnitude of the unfolding recession, even these bold monetary, fiscal and prudential policy 
measures might not suffice for all banks to withstand the troubled waters ahead. Among the 
four major vulnerabilities of European banks (Table 1) discussed in this section, deteriorating 
profitability turns out to be banks’ biggest challenge. Losses are eroding banks’ capital base and 
thus endangering their viability.
Table 1: EU banks’ major vulnerabilities and outlook (own illustration based on EBA Risk Dashboard)
Major vulnerabilities Short-term outlook
Market risk 
Asset prices plummeting
Effectively mitigated by ECB measures but further market corrections 
likely and impact of sharp fall in oil prices to be closely monitored
Funding liquidity risk
Banks‘ access to refinancing restricted
Manageable as long as banks dispose of eligible collateral to access 
central bank funding
Concentration risk
Home bias in banks‘ sovereign exposure
EU governments to agree on solidarity measures ensuring debt sus-
tainability for all Member States
Profitability
Surging NPLs eroding banks’ capital
EU policymakers to require banks to refrain from any sort of discre-
tionary distributions and maintain capital instead to absorb losses
Vulnerability #1 – Market risk
This is the risk of losses arising from adverse movements in market prices. Banks are exposed 
to market risk insofar as they engage in transactions involving securities, bonds, derivatives, 
commodities and foreign currencies. When Coronavirus infection rates and COVID-19 victim 
numbers started to rise rapidly and the financial impact of the lockdown measures on economies 
became apparent in early March 2020, financial markets panicked. Asset prices plummeted 
and bond funds showed record outflows whereas risk premia for sovereign bonds of the most 
vulnerable euro countries spiked, taken together causing significant market losses for banks.
To calm down financial markets and avoid liquidity shortages, the ECB and prudential supervisors 
started to intervene heavily from mid-March 2020. EU Member States announcements of credit 
guarantees and direct aid to the real economy helped further stabilise asset prices, although 
fiscal responses have been uneven across the EU due to different budgetary constraints (see 
e.g. Redeker/Hainbach: “Flattening the Recession Curve: Fiscal Responses to the Corona Crisis”). 
Table 2 shows the most relevant policy measures taken to address the financial market slump. 
The ECB’s enhanced asset purchases are likely to have had the biggest impact on banks’ market 
risk.
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Table 2: Market risk –  Most relevant policy reactions in the EU (own illustration based on IIF)
Monetary 
policy
•	 ECB launched an additional EUR 120 billion under the asset purchase programme (APP)
•	 ECB announced a EUR 750 billion bond buying initiative (PEPP) with no purchase limits 
•	 ECB included all commercial paper in the Corporate Sector Purchase Program (CSPP) 
•	 ECB enhanced or reactivated currency swap arrangements with other central banks
Fiscal 
policy
•	 EU Member States providing credit guarantees and direct aid to the real economy
Prudential 
measures
•	 SSM and EBA allowed banks to fully use capital buffers, to operate temporarily below 
the liquidity coverage ratio and announced relief in the composition of capital for Pillar 
2 Requirements
•	 SSM lowered capital requirements for market risk by reducing “qualitative market risk 
multiplier”
•	 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) pushed the deadlines for the revised 
market risk framework to 1 January 2023 
•	 European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) coordinated short selling bans in 
several EU Member States
Regarding the policy responses adopted to date, one measure deserves a critical note. In 
normal times without undue market stress, prudential supervisors ask specific banks to hold 
additional capital if the bank’s internal market risk model under-estimates its real market risk. 
The corresponding capital surcharge compensating for the possible under-estimation of capital 
requirements is called “qualitative market risk multiplier”. The recent decision by the SSM to 
reduce the qualitative market risk multiplier for the banks under its remit is thus benefitting only 
banks running unreliable internal market risk models. However, reducing capital requirements 
for banks showing an elevated risk profile contradicts the very objective of prudential regulation 
that is designed to ensure financial stability.
For now, ECB’s asset purchases seem to have been effective in mitigating market risk for banks. 
However, further corrections are likely and the impact of the sharp fall in oil prices is to be closely 
monitored. 
Vulnerability #2 – Funding liquidity risk
This is the risk that a bank is unable to meet its immediate and short-term obligations when they 
fall due. Banks can generally obtain funding from depositors parking their savings or from other 
financial institutions and the central bank in return for providing financial securities, also known 
as collateral. In times of stress, banks start to distrust each other and restrict interbank lending. 
Liquidity then becomes a scarce resource and its price, measured by interbank lending rates, 
increases. Looking at short-term and long-term interbank lending rates, we can observe that 
Euribor-1-month and Euribor-12-months rates started to spike in mid-March 2020, indicating 
restricted interbank lending, and stabilised thereafter. Compared to the excessive interbank 
lending rates measured at the height of the GFC, the recent increase seems modest.
The fact that short-term interbank interest rates fell to pre-Corona levels and that long-term 
interbank rates are still negative can be attributed to ample liquidity provided under monetary 
policy which has partly replaced interbank lending. Table 3 shows the relevant policy measures 
taken to address banks’ funding liquidity needs. ECB’s enhanced longer-term refinancing 
operations combined with the fact that interest rates on the main refinancing operations 
remained unchanged at 0.00% probably had the biggest impact on banks’ funding liquidity risk.
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Table 3: Funding liquidity risk – Most relevant policy responses in the EU (own illustration based on IIF)
Monetary 
policy
•	 ECB eased lending volume and rates under the targeted longer-term refinancing 
operations (TLTRO III) 
•	 ECB announced pandemic emergency longer-term refinancing operations 
(PELTROs) as backstop after the expiry of LTROs
•	 ECB launched an additional EUR 120 billion under the asset purchase 
programme (APP) to limit the tightening of European financial conditions
•	 ECB announced a EUR 750 billion bond buying initiative (PEPP) with no purchase 
limits 
•	 ECB included all commercial paper in the Corporate Sector Purchase Program
•	 ECB announced a package of measures to facilitate the availability of eligible 
collateral for Eurosystem counterparties to participate in liquidity providing 
operations
•	 Interest rate on the main refinancing operations and rates on the marginal 
lending facility and deposit facility remained unchanged at 0.00%, 0.25% and 
-0.50% respectively 
•	 ECB enhanced or reactivated currency swap arrangements with other central 
banks
Prudential 
measures
•	 SSM and EBA allowed banks to operate temporarily below the liquidity coverage 
ratio
For now, banks seem to be well-funded and benign refinancing conditions as well as extended 
currency swap lines should shield them from immediate longer-term funding needs. Funding 
liquidity risk remains manageable for banks as long as they dispose of enough collateral to access 
central bank funding. Since the ECB eased eligibility conditions for collateral in Eurosystem credit 
operations and signalled its readiness to go further down this road, banks should not face any 
severe refinancing problems in the near future.
Vulnerability #3 – Concentration risk
This is the risk of potential losses from a single exposure large enough to threaten a financial 
institution’s health or ability to maintain its core operations. To mitigate banks’ concentration 
risk, prudential regulation generally foresees limits for exposure to one single counterparty. 
However, these exposure limits do not apply to euro area sovereign bonds denominated and 
funded in domestic currency because euro area banks may apply a risk-weight of zero for these 
exposures. As a result, eurozone banks are not required to hold any equity for their eurozone 
sovereign bond holdings. Figure 1 shows that the sovereign exposure of eurozone banks is 
significantly biased towards their home countries, constituting a substantial concentration risk. 
If and when financial markets start to call into question the debt sustainability of Italy, Spain 
and France, which already have high levels of public debt and are particularly suffering from 
the Corona crisis, this is also bad news for their banks. Any default by their home country would 
cause them substantial losses.
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Figure 1: Sovereign exposure of banks as of 31.12.2019, by country (own illustration based on EBA data)
Seeking to break the sovereign-state-nexus, bank regulators are working on recalibrating the 
prudential treatment of sovereign risk but haven’t been able to agree on any changes yet. Since the 
doom loop is still a reality, banks’ concentration risk stemming from their exposure to vulnerable 
countries can only be mitigated by reducing the default risk of the sovereigns themselves. With 
its bold pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) for public and private sector asset 
purchases with an envelope of EUR 750 billion (Table 4), topping the Public Sector Purchase 
Programme (PSPP) already in place, the ECB has successfully limited the increase in Italian, 
French and Spanish credit default swap prices that point to the probability of a country’s default. 
Consequently, concentration risk for banks located in these countries is contained for now.
Table 4: Concentration risk – Most relevant policy responses in the EU (own illustration)
Monetary 
policy
ECB announced a EUR 750 billion bond buying initiative (PEPP) with no purchase limits
Fiscal mea-
sures
EU governments to agree on solidarity measures ensuring debt sustainability for all Member 
States (outstanding)
However, the ECB can maintain its expansive monetary policy only as long as it is necessary to 
fulfil its price stability mandate. In any case, monetary policy can only mitigate the risk premia on 
highly-indebted countries and the ECB is prohibited from engaging in all-out monetary financing. 
This is why the underlying problem of debt sustainability for all eurozone countries cannot be 
addressed by monetary policy instruments. Consequently, eurozone governments should swiftly 
agree on fiscal measures supporting the countries that are the most vulnerable and affected 
by the pandemic. On 23 April 2020, the European Council agreed to work towards establishing 
a recovery fund and tasked the European Commission to “urgently come up with a proposal”. 
For the EU recovery fund to be effective in mitigating the debt sustainability risks of certain 
eurozone countries and thus addressing banks’ concentration risk in home sovereign exposures, 
it is crucial that it does not increase Member States’ debt levels. Anticipating the proposal of 
the EU Commission, the German chancellor Angela Merkel and the French president Emmanuel 
Macron on 18 May 2020 suggested EUR 500 billion in joint spending financed through EU bonds. 
Grund, Guttenberg and Odendahl outline in their blueprint for a Pandemic Solidarity Instrument 
how this recovery fund could work in practice.  
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Vulnerability #4 – Banks’ weak profitability
Profitability is the ability to generate revenues in excess of expenses. Like any other company, 
banks are required to make profits in order to reward their shareholders and build up reserves that 
can absorb losses in an economic downturn. In general, banks generate revenues from fees on 
client transactions, the interest margin between loans and deposits, asset management services 
or proprietary trading. The bulk of banks’ profits is meant to come from lending to companies, 
households and government in general. Depending on the size and riskiness of their business, 
banks are required to hold a certain level of capital: less for loans secured by mortgages, more for 
investments in venture capital firms or exposures in default. 
The profitability of European banks was already weak before the COVID-19 pandemic broke 
out. While EU banks on average estimated their cost of equity (the return required by banks’ 
investors) at between 8% and 10%, their return on equity (banks’ net income divided by banks’ 
equity) stood at just 5.8% with German banks showing even negative returns (Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Banks’ return on equity as of 31.12.2019 by country (own illustration based on EBA data)
In many European countries, banks’ profitability is still hampered by the high proportion of non-
performing loans within total loans (NPL ratio). When borrowers are struggling to repay their 
loans, banks suffer in two ways: on the one hand, their profits shrink because of credit losses; 
on the other hand, their costs rise, because prudential regulation requires them to hold more 
capital, reflecting the increased riskiness of their loan book. After the peak of the GFC, EU banks’ 
NPL ratio had decreased gradually to 2.7% on average, but post-GFC-balance sheet repair is still 
ongoing in some EU Member States, in particular in Greece, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Italy and Portugal 
(Figure 3). 
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Figure 3: NPL ratios as of 31.12.2019 by country (own illustration based on EBA data)
Now, the COVID-19 pandemic is again putting companies and households in difficulties. To 
bridge their financing needs during the economic lockdown, national governments and the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) are providing loans, grants and credit guarantees. In addition, 
ample liquidity made available by the ECB as well as capital relief measures granted by prudential 
supervisors are encouraging banks to sustain lending to the real economy. Table 5 shows the 
relevant policy responses to address the credit crunch in the pandemic fallout. 
Table 5: Banks’ profitability – Most relevant policy responses in the EU (own illustration based on IIF)
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•	 ECB kept interest rate on the main refinancing operations and rates on the marginal lending facility 
and the deposit facility unchanged 
•	 ECB launched an additional EUR 120 billion under the asset purchase programme (APP)
•	 ECB announced a EUR 750 billion bond buying initiative (PEPP) to support money market mutual 
funds with no purchase limits 
•	 ECB included all commercial paper in the Corporate Sector Purchase Program (CSPP)
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•	 National governments provided credit guarantees and direct aid to the real economy
•	 Eurogroup freed up EUR 37 billion investment funds, EUR 28 billion structural funds, EUR 25 billion EIB 
working capital lending, EUR 20 billion EIB investments, EUR 8 billion to EIF
•	 Eurogroup set-up EUR 100 billion employment insurance fund, an EIB instrument intended to supply 
EUR 200 billion in liquidity to companies, EUR 240 billion in credit lines from the ESM
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•	 SSM and EBA allowed banks to fully use capital buffers, to operate temporarily below the liquidity 
coverage ratio and announced relief in the composition of capital for Pillar 2 Requirements
•	 SSM recommended that all banks avoid procyclical assumptions in their risk models to determine 
provisions
•	 EBA clarified the application of the prudential framework with regards to classification of default, 
forbearance, and IFRS 9
•	 Macroprudential authorities released or reduced countercyclical capital buffers, systemic risk buffers 
and buffers for other systemically important institutions
•	 SSM asked banks not to pay dividends until at least October 1, 2020. Banks should also refrain from 
share buy-backs aimed at remunerating shareholders
•	 EBA called on banks to follow prudent dividend and other distribution policies, including variable re-
muneration
•	 Single Resolution Board (SRB) gave banks more time to raise loss-absorbing capital (MREL instru-
ments)
0,0%
5,0%
10,0%
15,0%
20,0%
25,0%
30,0%
35,0%
GR C
Y
BG I
T PT PL HU H
R RO S
I IE ES M
T SK FR AT BE NL LV DK EE LT F
I
CZ DE LU SE
EU 2,7%
8/10
While these measures are easing the burden for banks by decreasing the risk of borrowers’ 
default, the relief for banks is only of a temporary nature. The longer the shutdown and the 
slower the recovery, the more borrowers will be unable to repay their loans. The policy responses 
given so far are keeping the real economy afloat but they don’t generate profits for banks that 
may offset the forthcoming losses. As a result, banks’ loss absorbing capacity, i.e. capital, erodes, 
putting their medium-term viability at risk. Figure 4 summarizes the challenges banks are facing 
due to the pandemic-induced economic fallout.
Figure 4: Losses from pandemic fallout erode EU banks’ capital and endanger their viability
Section 1 has analysed the four major vulnerabilities of European banks and evaluated the effects 
of policy measures adopted so far. (1) Market and (2) funding liquidity risks have been mitigated 
while (3) concentration risk could be tackled by a European recovery fund. However, recent policy 
measures fall short of addressing banks’ deteriorating (4) profitability. Losses from defaulting 
borrowers will erode banks’ capital, thereby endangering their viability.
2 European Commission’s “CRR quick-fix” banking package puts financial stability at risk
Section 1 has shown that in absence of substantial profits offsetting the surge in non-performing 
loans, banks rely on sufficient capital to absorb forthcoming losses. According to recent estimates, 
the economic impact of the Corona crisis might exceed by far any past EU banking stress test and 
could thus deplete entirely the capital buffers of some banks (see e.g. BIS Bulletin No 11). To 
weather banks for this crisis, policymakers should consequently look for possibilities to at least 
maintain or even increase banks’ capital. In the upcoming months, banks will need capital not 
only to absorb losses but also to hand out additional loans to finance the recovery. However, 
the European Commission on 28 April 2020 put forward a legislative banking package proposal 
(“CRR quick-fix”) which would effectively lower banks’ capital requirements (Box 1). 
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Box 1: Summary of EU Commission proposal for changes to the Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR)
Mitigating the impact of IFRS 9 provisions on regulatory capital
To mitigate the significant increase in the expected credit loss (ECL) provisions of banks as required under 
IFRS 9, banks are allowed to add back to their regulatory capital any increase in new expected credit loss 
provisions that they recognise in 2020 and 2021.
Leverage ratio 
Banks’ exposures to central banks can be excluded for a maximum of one year from the calculation of 
the leverage ratio requirement. The date of application of the leverage ratio buffer requirement for glob-
al systemically important institutions (G-SIIs) is deferred by one year to 1 January 2023. 
Treatment of publicly guaranteed loans
Non-performing loans guaranteed by the public sector shall receive a preferential treatment under the 
minimum loss coverage requirement for non-performing loans (the so-called ‘NPL backstop’) which in 
normal times is meant to ensure that banks set aside sufficient funds to cover NPL risks.
Application deadlines for capital relief measures under CRR 2 
The application deadline for specific capital relief measures introduced by the last revision of the CRR 
(exemption of certain software assets from capital deductions, preferential treatment for certain loans 
backed by pensions or salaries, revised SME supporting factor and new infrastructure supporting factor) 
is brought forward.
The Commission justifies its legislative proposal with the aim of maintaining bank lending to the 
real economy during the present acute crisis. While any reduction in capital requirements does 
give banks breathing space for additional lending, it comes with substantial risks. First, capital 
buffers should not fall below a level that jeopardise banks’ solvency. Since micro-prudential 
supervisors and macro-prudential authorities already reduced capital requirements by EUR 120 
billion and EUR 30 billion respectively, additional capital relief might undermine banks’ resilience. 
Second, capital relief measures are only effective in encouraging bank lending if excessive capital 
requirements are the constraining factor and not investors’ expectations as market analysts 
currently believe. Third, a legislative package consisting solely of capital relief measures is 
signalling to bank shareholders that capital requirements are flexible and, if banks go bust, there 
is less capital to cover losses which is putting not only shareholders and bond holders but also 
unsecured bank depositors and ultimately taxpayers at higher risk. This is even more true since 
the Single Resolution Board (SRB) overseeing bank crisis planning and management has given 
lenders extra time to build up their cushions of debt that can be bailed in if required in handling 
a failure.
Against this backdrop, policymakers are asked to strike the right balance between granting relief 
to banks to avoid a credit crunch and maintaining capital buffers to ensure banks’ viability. Given 
the capital relief measures already adopted by prudential supervisors, the Commission proposal 
seems to overshoot the overall supervisory forbearance for banks, thereby endangering financial 
stability.
3 Capital conservation will be key for banks to withstand the crisis
Contrary to the European Commission’s proposal on lower capital requirements, banks’ loss 
absorbing capacity should be maintained so as to preserve their resilience. Capital conservation 
would mean preventing banks from distributing retained or current earnings, thereby reducing 
their loss absorbing capacity. Currently, banks are shrinking their capital base by paying dividends 
to their shareholders, coupon payments to holders of bonds that can be converted into capital 
(so-called Additional Tier 1 instruments) and excessive variable remuneration to their employees. 
With the objective of preserving appropriate capital levels, SSM and EBA have recommended 
to banks they suspend dividends, share buybacks and excessive bonus payments. However, 
due to legal concerns, the prudential supervisors were unable to bindingly require all banks to 
suspend distributions. Since individual banks fear their investors might view the voluntary cut 
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in distributions as a sign of unsound financial health, they are hesitant to suspend all types of 
discretionary distribution. Consequently, to avoid any possible stigma effect for individual banks 
and ensure a level playing field in the internal market, there should be a hard requirement for 
strict internal capital conservation that applies to all financial institutions in the EU. 
When the European Commission’s CRR quick-fix proposal is negotiated in the near future by the 
Council and the European Parliament, the latter could amend the legislative text by introducing 
a binding suspension of distributions. If it is to be effective, such a requirement should apply to 
all types of distribution, including coupon payments on AT1 instruments which were not part 
of the recommendations of the EBA and SSM. Since the suspension of distributions interferes 
with property rights, it should be temporary in nature and subject to objective conditions. The 
European Commission on 19 March 2020 recognised that, because of COVID-19, the entire 
EU economy is experiencing serious disturbance. Based on this extraordinary situation, the 
Commission justified its temporary permission for EU Member States to provide State Aid to 
companies which is normally forbidden so as to avoid distortions in the internal market. The 
application of the suggested distribution suspension requirement could be subjected to the 
European Commission recognition of a serious disturbance having to be complemented by the 
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) issuing a corresponding formal opinion. Given that banks are 
indirectly profiting from State Aid paid to their borrowers and that prudential supervisors have 
already lowered substantially banks’ capital requirements, a temporary distribution suspension 
seems to be a proportionate measure to ensure financial stability.
Conclusion
The financial losses from the economic fallout of the pandemic will erode banks’ capital and 
endanger their resilience. So far, policy responses have concentrated on keeping the real economy 
afloat but have failed to improve banks’ resilience. EU policymakers need to strike the right 
balance between providing capital relief in order to avoid a credit crunch and maintain prudential 
buffers to ensure banks’ viability. The European Commission’s recent banking package proposal 
seems to overshoot the supervisory forbearance for banks, thereby endangering financial 
stability. European co-legislators should instead require banks to preserve capital themselves by 
temporarily suspending the pay-out of dividends, AT1 coupons and excessive bonuses. Depending 
on the depth of the recession and the scale of economic losses, capital conservation alone may 
not be sufficient. Further measures to create additional bank capital such as establishing bad 
banks or injecting public money may well be necessary.
